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This monograph is about the current status of the program; not so much its evidential status as what the program is and where it does, and doesn't, seem natural to try to apply it. Specifically I want to do the following things: distinguish the general claim that there are psychological faculties from a particular version of that claim, which I shall call the modularity thesis; enumerate some of the properties that modular cognitive systems are likely to exhibit in virtue of their modularity ; and consider whether it is possible to formulate any plausible hypothesis about which mental processes are likely to be the modular ones. Toward the end of the discussion, I'll also try to do something by way of disentangling the faculty jmodularity issues from what I'll call the thesis of Epistemic Boundedness: the idea that there are endogenously determined constraints on the kinds of problems that human beings can solve, hence on the kinds of things that we can know. (en) |
