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The that concluded the Second World War and formulated the Allied post-war strategy also came under heavy criticism for its inadequacy and short-sightedness. Like several other students of politics and war, General Fueller was also its vehement critic. His contention was that the Allied leaders had sacrificed the vital necessity of obtaining a durable peace at the altar of securing the unconditional surrender of Germany. The great military thinker had, however, no alternative of his own to suggest to them. As the Second World War came to a close, the Allied war effort also began to give way to their respective national interests. Each side, however, had its own interpretation of what constituted its interpretation of what constituted its enlightened national interests. Russia saw her interests in conquering the heart of Europe, the Allies, in the destruction of the German military might. The consideration of peace did weigh heavy on the minds of the nations of Europe whenever they developed the means to destroy one-another. Such an atmosphere prevailed after the conclusion of each devastating war and after the atomic explosion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, it did not last long. The Europeans soon came to realise that there did exist means of protection against weapons that were once looked upon as total and absolute. Once that happened, their baser and destructive elements again overtook the saner ones. Similar motives underline the present age of 'detente' and 'deterrence'. The considerations of peace come to human mind only when the choice is between 'suicide' and 'co-existence'. They are the by-products of exigency, not of a recognised or consistent policy or philosophy. They failed to stand the test of time in the past, nor are they resulting in durable global peace at present. Indeed, they have no worth while role to play in the future. (en) |
