|
so:text
|
The natural balance of the constitution is this—that the Crown should appoint its ministers, that those ministers should have the confidence of the House of Commons, and that the House of Commons should represent the sense and wishes of the people. Such was the machinery of our government; and if any wheel of it went wrong, it deranged the whole system. Thus, when the Stuarts were on the throne, and their ministers did not enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons, the consequence was tumult, insurrection, and civil war throughout the country. At the present period, the ministers of the Crown possess the confidence of the House of Commons, but the House of Commons does not possess the esteem and reverence of the people. The consequences to the country are equally fatal. We have seen discontent breaking into outrage in various quarters—we have seen every excess of popular frenzy committed and defended—we have seen alarm universally prevailing among the upper classes, and disaffection among the lower—we have seen the ministers of the Crown seek a remedy for these evils in a system of severe coercion—in restrictive laws—in large standing armies—in enormous barracks, and in every other resource that belongs to a government which is not founded on the hearts of its subjects. (en) |
