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With the invention of the atomic weapons, there appeared, between 1945 and 1955, a class of strategists who looked upon the nuclear bomb as the 'absolute' weapon of war. Accordingly, they formulated the theory of the strategy of, best described by the similitude of 'two scorpions in a bottle', a metaphor coined by J. Robert Oppenheimer. With further developments in nuclear bombs and greater knowledge of their effects came Dulles' theory of massive nuclear retaliation enunciated in 1954 and Mcnamara's flexible response. This was followed by other schools of thought hovering round graduated deterrence, second strike capability and the oceanic system. In 1959, denounced the theory of the 'balance of terror'. His thesis was that a deterrent force existed only if it was capable of inflicting reprisals. He laid down a set of six conditions for a second strike capability and came to conclude that the United States possessed none of them at that time. Dr. Henry Kissinger, in his famous book, 'Necessity for Choice' embraced the new gospel ofs and introduced the element of 'credibility' to 'deterrence'. "Deterrence," he wrote, "requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor." Since 1960, deterrence has dominated the realm of strategy in one from or the other; it has been variously described as active and passive; offensive and defensive; direct and indirect; relative and total or absolute; positive and negative; limited and general; counter-force and counter-city, and so on. (en) |
